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CASE NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW—The Road Not Taken: Parameters of the
Speedy Trial Right and How Due Process Can Limit Prosecutorial Delay;
Humphrey v. State, 185 P.3d 1236 (Wyo. 2008).
*USTIN $ARAIE

INTRODUCTION
The murder of Jack Humphrey occurred early morning on November
22, 1977.1 The events surrounding his death led police to identify his wife,
Rita Humphrey, as the prime suspect.2 The State of Wyoming subsequently
indicted Humphrey for ﬁrst-degree murder on April 11, 1980.3 Incriminating
evidence included an adulterous affair between Humphrey and Ron Akers,
which continued soon after the death of Jack Humphrey.4 Overdue bills, bad
checks, and unaccounted-for withdrawals additionally strained the Humphreys’
relationship.5 Police found Humphrey’s custom-made riﬂe and a shell casing in
the snow outside her home where the victim was shot.6 This discovery, along
with a gunshot-residue analysis revealing gunpowder on her left hand, implicated
Humphrey.7 The victim’s sister, Bonnie Humphrey, approached Humphrey at the
police station the morning of the murder, and Humphrey allegedly hid her face
and cried: “God, what have I done?”8
Following an April 11, 1980 indictment, Humphrey applied for a preliminary
hearing and waived her right to a speedy trial by agreeing to a hearing date of June
23, 1980.9 Despite the affair, gunpowder residue, and other suggestive evidence,
the preliminary hearing resulted in the dismissal of the murder charges due to
lack of probable cause.10 Twenty-four years later, the State recharged Humphrey
for ﬁrst-degree murder on March 5, 2004.11 Humphrey contended the victim’s

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming College of Law, 2010. I am grateful to my
parents for all of their support and guidance over the years.
1

Humphrey v. State (Humphrey II), 185 P.3d 1236, 1241 (Wyo. 2008).

2

Id. at 1242.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 1241.

6

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1241.

7

Id. at 1242.

8

Id. at 1241–42.

9

Id. at 1242.

10

Id. (stating the county court formally dismissed the charges on August 22, 1980).

11

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1242.
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sister, the newly elected mayor of Evansville, Wyoming, abused her appointment
by compelling police to reopen Humphrey’s case and press charges.12
In response to the twenty-four year delay preceding these renewed charges,
Humphrey challenged her indictment on the grounds of a constitutional, speedy
trial violation.13 She argued a prejudiced defense, and the Natrona County
District Court agreed with this claim.14 The district court found that the twentyfour year delay between indictments led to the unavailability of evidence, which
signiﬁcantly damaged Humphrey’s defense and required case dismissal.15 Missing
evidence included the attorney ﬁles used in Humphrey’s original defense and the
records from the 1980 preliminary hearing.16 Humphrey valued this evidence
since her defense at the 1980 hearing resulted in dismissal of her case.17
However, the State appealed and the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
the district court misapplied the speedy trial analysis, and remanded the case for
a new trial.18 At trial, Humphrey continued to assert her procedural rights to a
speedy trial and due process, but the district court overruled these objections.19
Ultimately, a jury convicted Humphrey of second-degree murder.20 For a second
time this case received appellate review.21 The Wyoming Supreme Court, in
Humphrey II, declined to ﬁnd either a speedy trial or due process violation and
afﬁrmed Humphrey’s conviction.22
This case note discusses the scope of one’s speedy trial right and its relationship
to the law of pre-charge delay.23 The right to a speedy trial and due process both
serve as procedural safeguards, but they address different aspects of the criminal
process which, as the case history shows, can confuse practitioners.24 Beyond
12

Id. at 1247.

13

Id. at 1242.

14

Id. (claiming the twenty-four year delay between her 1980 and 2004 prejudiced her defense
since exculpatory evidence was no longer available for rebutting the State’s evidence).
15

Id. at 1242, 1246 n.6 (noting the Natrona County District Court dismissed Humphrey’s
criminal charges in 2004 because of unobtainable evidence and witnesses).
16

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1248.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 1242–43 (citing to Humphrey v. State (Humphrey I), 120 P.3d 1027 (Wyo. 2005)).

19

Id. at 1243 (declining to ﬁnd either a speedy trial violation or a violation of due process).

20

Id. (Humphrey’s trial began March 13, 2006 and concluded March 24, 2006).

21

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1243. Humphrey appealed her conviction. Id.

22

Id. at 1246–47 (concluding the reasons for delay between Humphrey’s 2005 indictment
and 2006 trial outweighed alleged prejudice, and the defendant failed to prove substantial prejudice
caused by intentional misconduct by the prosecution).
23

See infra notes 26–129 and accompanying text.

24

Humphrey I, 120 P.3d at 1029–30 (ﬁnding both the district court and the defendant incorrectly
believed that one’s speedy trial right continues between dismissal of charges and re-indictment).
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clarifying when the speedy trial right activates, this note seeks to explain the potential
of due process as a guard against harmful delays in criminal prosecutions.25

BACKGROUND
Humphrey challenged the renewed murder charge against her on constitutional
grounds.26 Declining to hold the delays in Humphrey II as constitutional violations,
the Wyoming Supreme Court applied principles and law promulgated by a
line of United States Supreme Court cases.27 Consequently, an examination of
these United States Supreme Court cases explains the progression of speedy trial
and due process law, and illuminates the court’s analysis of Humphrey II.28 The
Speedy Trial Clause and Due Process Clause provide distinguishable protections
against prosecutorial delay.29 Therefore, this section will explain the parameters
of the Speedy Trial Clause, and then discuss how due process limits prosecutorial
delay.30

4HE 2IGHT TO A 3PEEDY 4RIAL
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right
to a speedy trial, which is considered one of our most basic rights.31 Wyoming’s
Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure contain similar guarantees.32 In
Wyoming, a defendant can challenge pre-trial delay either by demonstrating the
State’s failure to adhere to Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure § 48(b), or by
alleging deprivation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.33 This section
will focus on the application of the constitutional objection to a speedy trial
violation.34
25

See infra notes 171–240 and accompanying text (urging the Wyoming Supreme Court to
adopt a due process analysis that mimics speedy trial analyses to better ensure fairness in criminal
trials).
26

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1241, 1243–49 (asserting a violation of the Speedy Trial and Due
Process clauses of the United States Constitution).
27

Id.

28

See infra notes 31–170 and accompanying text.

29

See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of the speedy trial

right).
30

See infra notes 31–129 and accompanying text.

31

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed.”); see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 800 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining the presence of speedy trial notions since the Magna Carta).
WYO. CONST. art. 1 § 10 (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . .
to a speedy trial.”); WYO. R. CR. P. 48(b)(5) (“Any criminal case not tried or continued as provided
in this rule shall be dismissed 180 days after arraignment.”).
32

33

See Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1243 (evaluating both).

34

See infra notes 35–95 and accompanying text.
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Despite the early existence of the speedy trial right in American law, the scope
of this constitutional right lacked a full assessment until the United States Supreme
Court heard "ARKER V 7INGO in 1972.35 This case involved the murder of an elderly
couple, and the prosecutor suspected a man named Willie Barker.36 To bolster
its case, the State repeatedly postponed trial in order to extract incriminating
testimony from Barker’s accomplice, pushing the trial back almost ﬁve years.37
After spending ten months in prison, Barker posted bond and remained free until
his trial, at which time the jury convicted him of murder.38
In response to Barker’s contention that the government denied him a speedy
trial, the United States Supreme Court created a test to deﬁne the concept of
“speedy.”39 The Court acknowledged the myriad of interests involved when
bringing an accused to trial.40 One such interest involves the impact to an accused’s
defense resulting from a delay between arrest and trial.41 Moreover, this type of
delay can negatively affect a criminal’s rehabilitation, especially when a defendant
remains incarcerated.42
In addition, Barker’s ability to post bond and spend most of his accused life
in the community exempliﬁes how delay provides a criminal with the chance
to do more harm.43 Long delays may also entice accused individuals to “jump
bail,” and when unable to post bond, the problem of overcrowded jails arises.44
Overpopulation in prisons can lead to rioting, and longer jail terms increase the
overall price of detaining an individual.45 In addition, a swift and fair proceeding
also furthers society’s interest in bringing an accused to trial.46 A congested docket
allows defendants to offer guilty pleas in exchange for lesser offenses, which does
not comport with society’s retributive values.47

35

407 U.S. 514, 515–16 (1972).

36

Id. at 516.

37

Id. at 516, 518.

38

Id. at 517–18.

39

Id. at 529–30.

40

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 529–36.

41

Id. at 521 (expressing concern with lost evidence, faded memories, and missing witnesses).

42

Id. at 520 n.10, 12 (citations omitted).

43

Id. at 519.

44

Id. at 520.

45

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 520–21; see generally James J. Stephan, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, State Prison
Expenditures, 2001 1 (2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/spe01.pdf (ﬁnding average
state and Federal costs of housing one inmate equaled $22,650 per year and $22,632 per year,
respectively).
46

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 519–20 (citations omitted).

47

Id. (citations omitted).
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Based on these legitimate concerns, the United States Supreme Court in
"ARKER held a prosecutor has an afﬁrmative duty to bring an accused to trial, and to
do so in a manner that upholds due process.48 Ultimately, the Court held the best
way to ensure due process was to balance four factors: the length of delay, reasons
for such delay, whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial,
and the level of prejudice affecting the defendant.49 Adopting a multi-faceted test
allows courts to carefully assign a value to each factor based on the circumstances,
in relation to the others, as no one factor is dispositive.50 The virtue of carefully
considering all parties’ interests led the majority of courts nationwide to accept
and apply "ARKERS factor test.51

&ACTOR /NE 4HE ,ENGTH OF $ELAY
The ﬁrst factor relates to the promptness of bringing a defendant to trial, but
also serves as a threshold question, necessary to answer before a court must engage
in a full speedy trial analysis.52 If a defendant can point to a lengthy delay, the
circumstances will imply prejudice to the defendant and warrant further inquiry
into the harms of the delay.53 Furthermore, this factor establishes the time frame
during which prejudice can result.54 A court will more likely ﬁnd a speedy trial
violation if the pre-trial delay is signiﬁcant, because ongoing delays intensify the
degree of prejudice presumed to harm a defendant.55 Therefore, when the speedy
trial clock begins has signiﬁcant implications for the total analysis.56
48
Id. at 527 (citing Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37–38 (1970) and Hodges v. United States,
408 F.2d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1969)).
49
Id. at 530 (rejecting alternative methods of discerning a speedy trial violation, including a
ﬁxed-time and demand-waiver analysis).
50
Id. at 533; Warner v. State, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001) (noting the analysis asks whether a
delay prior to trial unreasonably, and substantially, impairs an accused’s right to fair procedure).
51
%G, United States v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing to "ARKER V
Wingo and applying the balancing test set forth therein); United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 87
(1st Cir. 2001) (same); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Colo. 1993) (same); State v.
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1990) (same).
52
"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 521, 530 (“Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”).
53
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (acknowledging that post-accusation
delays approaching one year will lead most courts to consider the threshold met); United States
v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986) (analyzing a 90-month delay); Warner, 28 P.3d at 26
(analyzing a 658-day delay); Sisneros v. State, 121 P.3d 790, 797 (Wyo. 2005) (performing a
speedy trial analysis based on a 349-day delay); Strandlien v. State, 156 P.3d 986, 990 (Wyo. 2007)
(analyzing a 762-day delay).
54
3EE "ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532 (implying a court must only consider prejudice that occurs
during the post-charge delay).
55
%G, Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 (noting the degree of presumed prejudice increases with the
passage of time); accord United States v. Batie, 433 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 2006).
56
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the length of delay
affects the total analysis.
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The United States Supreme Court in United States v. -ARION sought to clarify
when one’s speedy trial right activates.57 The -ARION Court noted the historic
policies for constitutionally protecting an accused’s speedy trial interest: long,
oppressive conﬁnement without explanation; the degree of personal anxiety
accompanied by such incarceration; and the notion that an accused will lose the
ability to adequately establish a defense while in prison.58 The Court held that
lengthy incarceration, corresponding anxiety, and prejudice to one’s defense were
interests implicated only after arrest or the ﬁling of formal charges.59 Therefore,
only the formal charging or arrest of an accused triggers the speedy trial right.60
A decade later, the United States Supreme Court heard another signiﬁcant case
and further explained the scope of the speedy trial right.61 The Court in United
3TATES V -AC$ONALD held delay between the dismissal of charges and re-indictment
should be assessed under the Due Process Clause, not the speedy trial right.62 The
-AC$ONALD Court justiﬁed this holding based on the same policies used to justify
why the speedy trial right did not protect against pre-charge delay.63 Despite prior
accusation, a person is no longer subjected to the same restrictions on liberty as
someone formally charged or under arrest.64 The United States Supreme Court
later expanded this holding when it declared that appearing for evidentiary
hearings and hiring counsel were also not events that triggered the speedy trial
clock.65

57

404 U.S. 307 (1971).

58

Id. at 320 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).

59

Id. Certainly, prejudice to an accused’s defense can occur before arrest or the ﬁling of public
charges, especially when a defendant remains unaware of the pending investigation against him or
her. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654–58. The -ARION Court held, however, that the Speedy Trial Clause
is not meant to completely shield a defendant from prejudice. -ARION, 404 U.S. at 319. The -ARION
Court stated:
[T]he major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart
from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense. . . . Arrest is a public act
that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail
or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his ﬁnancial resources, curtail
his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family
and his friends.
Id.
60

-ARION, 404 U.S. at 320.

61

United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982).

62

Id. at 7 (noting, once again, the unique interests implicated only upon formal indictment
or arrest).
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

,OUD (AWK, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986) (explaining that while bothersome, the Speedy Trial
Clause must not shield a suspect from every harm incidental to criminal proceedings).
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&ACTOR 4WO 4HE 2EASON FOR THE $ELAY
The United States Supreme Court in "ARKER discussed how courts should
analyze the reasons for delay.66 Valid reasons for delay, such as the unavailability
of an ill witness, should not affect the analysis, while intentional procrastination
should weigh heavily against the misbehaving party.67 Negligence also tips the
scale against the responsible party, although not as much as intentional conduct.68
Even overcrowded dockets must slightly weigh against the prosecution since it
has an afﬁrmative duty to try suspects in a manner that affords due process.69
The United States Supreme Court also determined how delays attributable to
interlocutory appeals should be factored in the analysis.70

&ACTOR 4HREE 4HE $EFENDANTS !SSERTION OF THE 3PEEDY 4RIAL 2IGHT
Speedy trial delays can beneﬁt a defendant when memories fade and evidence
disappears.71 The State has the burden of proof, thus, it may be in the defendant’s
best interest not to insist on a speedy trial and hope the prosecution fails to establish
guilt.72 A defendant’s failure to object to delays in the judicial process will not
amount to a waiver of the speedy trial right.73 The United States Supreme Court
in "ARKER charged courts to apply discretion and assign weight to a defendant’s
actions based on the defendant’s intentions, the effectiveness of his or her counsel,
and the frequency and force of any objections made.74 As a general rule, courts
must balance afﬁrmative requests for a speedy trial in favor of the claimant; such
requests evidence that delays were harmful.75

&ACTOR &OUR 0REJUDICE TO THE $EFENDANT
The Court in "ARKER listed three interests of a defendant worthy of
constitutional protection.76 The aims of the speedy trial clause are to (1) minimize
66

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 531.

67

Id. (citations omitted).

68

Id. (citations omitted).

69

Id. (citations omitted).

70

,OUD (AWK, 474 U.S. at 316 (valuing delays from appeals based on the merits of the
requested appeal, the importance of preventing unjust incarceration, and society’s interest in
protecting itself ).
71

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 521.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 527–29.

74

Id. at 529.

75

,OUD (AWK, 474 U.S. at 314; "ARKER, 407 U.S. at 531–32. The ,OUD (AWK Court warned,
however, that a superﬁcial demand for a speedy trial will not count as behavior evidencing an
accused’s deprivation of the right. ,OUD (AWK, 474 U.S. at 314.
76

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532 (citations omitted).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2009

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 9 [2009], No. 1, Art. 5

178

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

an accused’s jail-time preceding trial, thereby (2) reducing unnecessary anxiety
and (3) the risk of losing evidentiary support for a defendant’s case.77 The "ARKER
Court considered these three interests as sub-factors to the general concern
of prejudice to a defendant.78 In addition, "ARKER viewed the third sub-factor,
prejudice to one’s defense, as the most signiﬁcant when determining the existence
of a speedy trial violation.79
This assertion contradicted what the Court stated a year earlier in United States
V -ARION about the primary role of the speedy trial clause.80 Twice since -ARION,
the United States Supreme Court suggested that preventing prejudice to one’s
defense was a secondary concern in a speedy trial analysis.81 However, in Doggett
v. United States the Court eventually returned to its position in "ARKER, holding
prejudice as the most important, protectable interest.82 The Wyoming Supreme
Court also considers the impairment of one’s defense as the most damaging form
of prejudice caused by pre-trial delay.83
A court’s valuation of factor four, prejudice to one’s defense, depends on what
an accused can prove at trial.84 Doggett, the most recent United States Supreme
Court case discussing this issue, acknowledged that prejudice can exist despite
what is speciﬁcally demonstrable, and the inability to show actual prejudice does
not preclude a court from ﬁnding a speedy trial violation.85 The Court, relying
on its commentary in "ARKER, recognized the inherent difﬁculty in proving actual
harm to one’s defense caused by the passage of time.86 In response, the Court
77
Id. at 531 n.32, 532 (reiterating the historic reasons for the speedy trial right, as identiﬁed in
5NITED 3TATES V -ARION: lengthy pre-trial conﬁnement, corresponding anxiety, and prejudice to one’s
defense); see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of arrest or formal
accusation on a defendant).
78

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532.

79

Id. (“[T]he most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system.”).
80
-ARION, 404 U.S. at 320 (“[T]he major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee
exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense.”).
81

-AC$ONALD, 456 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted); ,OUD (AWK, 474 U.S. at 311.

82

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655.

83

Strandlien, 156 P.3d at 991 (citing "ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532); Whitney v. State, 99 P.3d 457,
475 (Wyo. 2004) (citation omitted).
84

See Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1146 (Wyo. 1992) (“Although [Defendant] has shown a
delay which could be prejudicial and did assert his right to speedy trial, he has not . . . demonstrated
actual prejudice from the delay.”); SEE ,OUD (AWK, 474 U.S. at 314 (afﬁrming the lower court’s
decision to give only “little weight” to the fourth factor since the defendant could only point to the
possibility of prejudice).
85

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655.

86

Id. (“[I]mpairment to one’s defense is the most difﬁcult form of . . . prejudice to prove
because time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.’” (quoting
"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532)). The Court added that the likelihood of prejudice is directly proportional
to length of pre-trial delay. Id. at 651–52.
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suggested that as delay intensiﬁes, the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice
begins to shift from the defendant to the State.87
Many courts have adopted Doggett’s method of analyzing prejudice.88
However, the unique and lengthy pre-trial delay in Doggett left courts with only an
outer limit as to when a delay requires the prosecution to rebut a presumption of
prejudice.89 In Doggett, more than eight years passed between formal indictment
and Doggett’s trial, compelling the Court to charge the prosecution with rebutting
a presumption of prejudice against the defendant.90 A similar delay would require
state courts to apply this burden-shifting procedure; however, Doggett did not
explain whether a presumption of prejudice could arise before an eight-year
delay.91 Wyoming courts have yet to encounter a case of excessive pre-trial delay
warranting the presumption that a defendant’s case suffered from prejudice.92
In summation, the line of United States Supreme Court cases emerging from
"ARKER and -ARION highlight the many interests implicated by delays in bringing
87

See id. at 657–58 n.4 (admitting Doggett failed to specify any prejudice from the eightand-a-half year delay between indictment and trial, but ﬁnding for him because the State did not
persuasively rebut his allegations by showing how the defendant was unharmed by the delay).
88

%G, State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 835 (Mont. 2007) (“[A s]howing by the accused
of particularized prejudice decreases, and the necessary showing by the State of no prejudice
correspondingly increases, with the length of the delay.”); see Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299, 304
(3rd Cir. 1994) (afﬁrming the lower court’s decision to apply the Doggett presumption, but ﬁnding
the State successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice); United States v. Aguirre, 994 F.2d
1454, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Five years delay attributable to the government’s mishandling of
[Defendant’s] ﬁle, like the eight year delay in Doggett, creates a strong presumption of prejudice . . .
the government [has not] ‘persuasively rebutted’ the presumption of prejudice.” (citations omitted));
State v. Williams, 698 N.E.2d 453, 454–55 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 1997) (ﬁnding a ﬁve-year delay
caused by prosecutorial negligence required the State to rebut a presumption of prejudice).
89
%G Pelletier v. Warden, 627 A.2d 1363, 1371 n.12 (distinguishing Doggett based on its
unique facts and signiﬁcant delay); Goodrum v. Quarterman, No. 06-20980, 2008 WL 4648459,
at *7 (5th Cir. Oct. 22, 2008) (“Additionally, the 2 1/2 year length of delay in this case falls well
short of the 6 years attributed to ofﬁcial negligence in Doggett and which warranted a presumption
of prejudice in that case.”) (citations omitted); Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1264 (10th Cir.
2004) (“[B]ecause the delay is less than six years, clearly established Supreme Court law does not
require application of the Doggett rule.”).
90

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658. The government was responsible for six years of the delay. Id.

91

Compare id. (ﬁnding a presumption of prejudice from a six-year delay due to prosecutorial
negligence), WITH !GUIRRE, 994 F.2d at 1457 (noting a greater delay in Doggett but requiring the
government to rebut a presumption of prejudice after ﬁve years), and United States v. Bergfeld,
280 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2002) (ﬁnding presumed prejudice after a ﬁve-year delay caused by the
government).
92

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1246 (holding until the length of delay gives rise to a probability
of substantial prejudice, the defendant retains the burden of proving prejudice). In Wyoming, a
561-day delay does not create a probability of substantial prejudice. Id.; Standlien, 156 P.3d at 991
(ﬁnding a delay of 762 days does not lead to a presumption of prejudice); Warner, 28 P.3d at 27
(holding delay of 658 days does not presumptively prejudice); Whitney, 99 P.3d at 475 (holding a
374 day delay is not presumptively prejudicial).
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defendants to trial.93 To harmonize zealous prosecutions with the mandates of the
Sixth Amendment, a four-factor test was devised.94 Consequently, this test and all
its nuances serve as the backbone of Wyoming’s speedy trial law.95

4HE &UNDAMENTAL 2IGHT TO $UE 0ROCESS "ARS %XCESSIVE $ELAY IN &ORMALLY
Charging or Arresting an Accused
Although the speedy trial right seeks to prevent harm from delays in the
judicial process, it cannot operate until the prosecution arrests or formally charges
an accused.96 Thus, the Speedy Trial Clause does not account for pre-charge or
pre-arrest delays in prosecution; however, other protections exist to accomplish
this goal.97 The United States Supreme Court in -ARION asserted that applicable
statutes of limitations serve this function, along with the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.98 The Due Process Clause, in pertinent part, indicates no
person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”
and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution compels states to ensure this
same guarantee.99 Consequently, Wyoming’s pre-charge law reﬂects the principles
and guidelines set forth in -ARION.100 Understanding Wyoming’s pre-charge law
requires an examination of the United States Supreme Court’s approach to this
issue.101
The Court in -ARION reiterated the maxim that due process signiﬁes a fair
trial.102 An ambiguous term itself, the -ARION Court did not say when a fair
trial exists, but recognized that a fair trial does not exist when the prosecution

93
See supra notes 52–92 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the speedy trial clause
in criminal prosecutions).
94
"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 529–30; ACCORD -AC$ONALD, 456 U.S. at 7; ,OUD (AWK, 474 U.S. at
312–16.
95

See Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1243–44, passim (applying the speedy trial law from the
applicable United States Supreme Court cases).
96

-ARION, 404 U.S. at 320.

97

Id. at 322–24.

98

Id.

99

Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V., WITH U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of . . . due process of law.”).
100
Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 658 (Wyo. 1993) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court’s
construction of the federal [Constitution] is both authoritative for the federal system and a
constitutional minimum which states must obey.”); see also Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1027–29
(Wyo. 1986) (adopting -ARION’s interpretation of due process in the context of pre-charge delay)
(citations omitted).
101

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

102

-ARION, 404 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted).
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(1) intentionally delays arrest or formal accusation of a defendant, and (2) such
delay was so extensive that it caused substantial prejudice to the accused’s defense.103
Thus, scrutinizing prosecutorial delay became a fact speciﬁc analysis.104
Two main factors illustrate why the -ARION Court set the base level of protection
at a showing of intentional misconduct by the state and actual prejudice to one’s
defense.105 First, the defendant alleged a violation of due process, notwithstanding
an unexpired statute of limitation.106 -ARION considered statutes of limitations as
“the primary guarantee” against attempted prosecution long after the commission
of a crime.107 By these legislative enactments, society acknowledges that a
defendant will be deprived of a fair trial at some point.108 Thus, as secondary
protection against delay, the -ARION Court required defendants to prove glaring
injustice before ﬁnding a due process violation.109
Second, -ARION valued prosecutorial discretion in choosing when to seek
convictions.110 The Court found it irrational to charge criminals immediately
when investigators could establish probable cause.111 In 5NITED 3TATES V ,OVASCO, the
United States Supreme Court held when pre-charge delay violates “fundamental
conceptions of justice” and “the community’s sense of fair play,” a court must
order dismissal of the case.112
The community’s sense of fair play embraces prosecutorial discretion regarding
when to charge and arrest suspects.113 Expecting the state to prosecute as soon as
legal, probable cause exists may lead to the dismissal of unripe, but worthy cases.114
Convincing a jury of a defendant’s guilt, at trial, requires more than probable
cause.115 Faced with the possibility of dismissals, prosecutors would imprison or
103

Id.

104

Id. at 324–25 (noting that length of delay cannot be dispositive because actual prejudice
can result from even short delays).
105

See id. at 322–24 (discussing the signiﬁcance of statutes of limitations and prosecutorial
discretion in choosing when to charge defendants).
106

Id. at 324.

107

-ARION, 404 U.S. at 324 (citing United States v. Ewell, 386 U.S. 116, 122 (1966)).

108

See generally id. at 322–23 (discussing the prejudicial effects of the passage of time).

109

Id. at 323–24 (explaining that statutes of limitation anticipate unfairness, but only by the
end of the limitation period).
110

Id. at 325 n.18 (citation omitted).

111

Id. (citation omitted).

112

,OVASCO, 431 U.S. at 790–91 (citations omitted).

113

Id. at 791, 792, 793, passim (citations omitted).

114

Id. at 791–92 (citations omitted).

115

Id. at 792 n.11 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)); Granzer v. State, 193 P.3d 266, 269 (Wyo. 2008) (reciting proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as the evidentiary standard of proving guilt in criminal cases).
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charge defendants earlier than necessary, and before fully developing its case.116
In turn, the prosecutor would be racing against the speedy trial clock and the
accused would face longer periods of anxiety, unemployment, and diminished
social relations.117 Reality proves that cases often involve multiple actors and
various crimes, and simply require more time to develop than what is necessary
to arrest or charge a suspect.118 Thus, a prosecutor must have freedom to decide
when it should seek convictions.119
Courts have recognized the difﬁculties inherent in meeting the requirements
of this -ARION test.120 In particular, showing prosecutorial misconduct poses a
signiﬁcant hurdle since the prosecution usually controls the information essential
to prove this element.121 In response, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided
to adopt a more balanced test but retained the defendant’s burden of proving
each element: if the defendant can make a prima facie showing of intentional
misconduct, the State must submit its reasons for delaying prosecution.122 To
prevail, the State need only rebut the assertion that the delay resulted from bad
faith.123
The Wyoming Supreme Court also explained its method of evaluating actual
prejudice.124 If a defendant no longer has access to evidence, and the defendant
can prove that the use of such evidence would have altered the outcome of the
116

,OVASCO, 431 U.S. at 792 n.11 (citations omitted).

117

Id.

118

Id. at 729–93 (citations omitted).

119

Id. at 795.

120

See Phyllis Goldfarb, 7HEN *UDGES !BANDON !NALOGY 4HE 0ROBLEM OF $ELAY IN #OMMENCING
#RIMINAL 0ROSECUTIONS, 31 WM. & MARY L.REV. 607, 620, 621, passim (1990) (discussing the hurdles
to proving actual prejudice and tactical delay by the prosecution); Tiemens v. United States, 724
F.2d 928, 929 (11th Cir. 1984) (“It was recently observed that this standard is an exceedingly high
one.”); see United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1985) (adopting a due process
analysis that requires less than actual prejudice and intentional delay).
121

Fortner, 843 P.2d at 1143.

122

Compare id. at 1143–44, and United States v. Comosona, 614 F.2d 695, 696–97 (10th
Cir. 1980) (shifting the burden of proof upon a prima facie showing of tactical delay or harassment
by the prosecution), WITH United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 549 (5th Cir. 1986) (requiring
the defendant to carry the entire burden of proof for both elements: actual prejudice and strategic
delay), and United States v. Watkins, 709 F.2d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring the defendant
carry the entire burden of proof for both elements). Neither -ARION nor ,OVASCO clariﬁed how courts
should allocate the burden of proof. See Goldfarb, supra note 120, at 623, 624, passim (discussing
how various state and federal courts choose to distribute the burden of proving actual prejudice
and intentional delay by the prosecution). See also 'ONZALES, 805 P.2d at 631–32 (explaining the
jurisdictional differences in allocating the burden of proof ).
123

Fortner, 843 P.2d at 1143 (characterizing bad faith as harassment or strategic delay).

124

Russell v. State, 851 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Wyo. 1993) (“[T]o establish substantial prejudice,
[Defendant] is required to show . . . that, but for the delay, the result of his trial would be different.”).
-ARION interchangeably used “actual prejudice” and “substantial prejudice” when referring this
element of the test. 3EE -ARION, 404 U.S. at 324, 326.
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trial, a court will ﬁnd such circumstances amount to actual prejudice.125 The
defendant must convey the value of missing evidence or witnesses by emphasizing
the exculpatory propensity of such evidence.126 Again, the reasonable probability
of actual prejudice will persuade a Wyoming court to dismiss charges, not possible
prejudice.127
In summary, the United States Supreme Court decisions in "ARKER and
-ARION laid the foundation for analyzing the speedy trial right, as well as due
process violations caused by pre-charge delay.128 The Wyoming Supreme Court
has structured its law accordingly, and recently confronted a murder case ripe for
applying both constitutional principles.129

PRINCIPAL CASE
Humphrey accused the State of violating her right to a speedy trial and
denying her due process when prosecutors reinstated murder charges against
her, twenty-four years after the dismissal of her case.130 The Wyoming Supreme
Court, in a unanimous decision, ruled the State did not violate her constitutional
rights.131 Beginning with the speedy trial analysis, the court ﬁrst considered
whether the prosecution failed to follow Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure
§ 48(b), ﬁnding Humphrey waived the time limitations rule and consented to a
trial date beyond the 180-day requirement.132 Next, the court addressed the speedy
trial claim from a constitutional standpoint, applying the "ARKER test.133 Although
the State re-charged Humphrey twenty-four years after her initial indictment,
the court excluded this time when evaluating the ﬁrst factor, length of delay.134

125
2USSELL, 851 P.2d at 1280; Story, 721 P.2d at 1029 (suggesting defendants must prove actual
prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence).
126

Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1349–50 (Wyo. 1996).

127

Id. at 1350 (declining to dismiss based on speculative accusations); Fortner, 843 P.2d at
1143 (“Appellant has not claimed that the roommate would deﬁnitely support an alibi defense, only
that he might if he could be found. This falls short of being actual prejudice.”).
128

"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 529–30; -ARION, 404 U.S. at 322–24.

129

See Humphrey II, 185 P.3d 1241–49 (analyzing Defendant’s speedy trial claim and due
process claim).
130

Id. at 1242.

131

Id. at 1249.

132

Id. at 1243; see supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (noting the procedural rule).

133

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1243–44.

134

Id. at 1244 (running the speedy trial clock from her original indictment on April 11, 1980
until dismissal on August 22, 1980; tacking on the time between her second indictment on March
5, 2004 and her trial on March 13, 2006; excluding the time from December 2004 to October
2005, when the district court brieﬂy dismissed her second charge).
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Accordingly, the delay totaled 561 days, which compelled the court to continue
its speedy trial analysis.135
The second factor, reasons for the delay, neutrally affected both Humphrey
and the State.136 The third factor, assertion of the constitutional right, weighed
slightly in Humphrey’s favor since she asserted her speedy trial right through
motions, but acquiesced when the State sought continuances.137 In addressing the
fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant, the court noted the three evils targeted
by the speedy trial clause: lengthy pre-trial incarceration, corresponding anxiety,
and prejudice to one’s defense.138 The court also reiterated that defendants have
the burden of proving prejudice until the delay is truly excessive.139 The court
found the delay of 561 days insufﬁcient to presume prejudice.140
The court then addressed Humphrey’s claim of actual prejudice in connection
with the fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant.141 Humphrey argued the twentyfour years between her 1980 and 2004 indictments severely hampered her defense,
resulting in unavailable documents and witnesses.142 The court acknowledged that
this twenty-four year delay subjected Humphrey to signiﬁcant prejudice.143 The
twenty-four year delay, however, did not fall within the ambits of the Speedy Trial
Clause.144 The clause did account for the 561-day delay preceding Humphrey’s
2006 trial, but this delay was not responsible for the lost evidence.145 Accordingly,

135

Id.; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the threshold amount of delay
required to apply the "ARKER test).
136
Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1245 (explaining that of the 561-day delay, Humphrey sought
continuances and preliminary hearings, causing a 175-day delay; the State caused a 138-day delay
due to a continuance, part of which was sluggishness by the court; and 80 days originated from
neutral factors like miscommunication between the defendant and the State).
137

Id. (noting Humphrey asserted her right but accepted State scheduling, and made numerous
pretrial motions that required evidentiary hearings, and requested a ﬁve-month continuance in
order to ﬁle a complaint with the United States Supreme Court).
138

Id. at 1245–46 (citing "ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532).

139

Id. at 1246 (reminding the defendant that prejudice is only presumed after truly extensive

delay).
140

Id. (requiring Humphrey to bear the burden of proving prejudice).

141

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1249 (ﬁnding Humphrey failed to adequately make a claim of
actual prejudice).
142

Id. at 1246.

143

See id. at 1246 n.6.

144

Id. at 1246 (“[T]he protection of the Speedy Trial Clause has no application to the period of
time in which she was neither under arrest nor formally charged for the murder of her husband.”).
145

Id. (reiterating only post-charge, pre-trial delay implicates the Speedy Trial Clause, not delay
between a crime and prosecution).
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this factor did not weigh in favor of Humphrey, and the court ultimately ruled
that a comparison of all four "ARKER factors did not justify the dismissal of her
charge on the basis of a speedy trial violation.146
The Wyoming Supreme Court also analyzed whether re-charging the
defendant for the murder, twenty-four years after the dismissal of her 1980
indictment, amounted to a violation of due process.147 The court outlined the
elements necessary to prove such a violation: actual prejudice to the defendant
and intentional delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage.148 First, regarding
actual prejudice, the court found Humphrey’s claims of missing evidence and
unavailable witnesses did not support a ﬁnding of actual prejudice.149
The defendant argued that ﬁles used to establish her prior defense in 1980
had unique exculpatory value since her prior efforts convinced the district court to
dismiss the charges for lack of probable cause.150 However, the Wyoming Supreme
Court accorded little value to this argument because Humphrey could not point
to speciﬁc evidence in those documents that could alter the outcome of her current
trial.151 Next, the defendant pointed to missing tape-recordings and transcripts of
the 1980 preliminary hearing, which may have contained persuasive arguments
for Humphrey’s case and functioned to impeach the State’s key witnesses.152 The
court ruled Humphrey did not speciﬁcally explain how these items would help her
defense, and thus found they were not demonstrative of a prejudiced defense.153
Additionally, Humphrey claimed the missing ﬁnancial records of her 1977
bank account would prove that she and her former husband did not have monetary
problems.154 Humphrey argued these documents would effectively refute the
prosecution’s argument that ﬁnancial instability caused tension between Jack
and Rita Humphrey and motivated her to kill Mr. Humphrey.155 The Wyoming
Supreme Court also found this speculative and not representative of actual
prejudice.156 The court reiterated that mere passage of time will not emancipate

146

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1246.

147

Id. at 1246–49.

148

Id. at 1247.

149

Id. at 1248.

150

Id.

151

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1248–49.

152

Id. at 1248 (arguing that certain witnesses for the prosecution have altered their stories,
rendering Humphrey more culpable).
153

Id. at 1249 (ruling this evidence to be of no value).

154

Id. at 1248.

155

Id.

156

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1249 (noting similar evidence was available through crossexamining the State’s witness for this issue).
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an accused and that the legislature excluded statutes of limitations to prevent such
an event.157 Rather, a defendant must prove actual prejudice.158 Ultimately, the
court in Humphrey II had no basis on which to dismiss Humphrey’s case due to
actual prejudice to the defendant.159
Regarding the second element of the due process violation claim, intentional
delay by the state, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that Humphrey’s allegations
did not satisfy the requisite prima facie showing of prosecutorial misconduct.160
Humphrey accused the victim’s sister, Bonnie Humphrey, of using her status as
mayor to hire a police chief who would reopen Humphrey’s case.161 The court
explained that aside from Bonnie Humphrey’s motive, Humphrey could not
prove the prosecutors, themselves, intentionally delayed pressing charges.162
Nonetheless, Humphrey urged the court to require the State to explain the reasons
for postponing accusation.163 The court declined to uproot its law, and ruled that
Humphrey failed to meet her burden for this element.164
In deciding how to assess the twenty-four years preceding Humphrey’s
renewed charges, the Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed the speedy trial right
and due process right using its established law.165 The court held the twenty-four
years did not fall within the ambits of speedy trial protection.166 Turning to the
protection of due process, the court did not ﬁnd that the State deprived Humphrey
of a fair trial.167 Although the Natrona County District Court believed the delay
left Humphrey prejudiced, the Wyoming Supreme Court did not ﬁnd actual
prejudice.168 The court also held that Humphrey failed to make a prima facie
case of prosecutorial bad faith.169 The outcome of the principal case evidences the
patent difﬁculties in proving the requisite elements of a due process violation.170

157

Id. at 1246–47 (quoting Vernier, 909 P.2d at 1348).

158

Id. at 1247, 1249 (“By itself, the fact 24 years elapsed between the dismissal of the original
criminal case and the ﬁling of the new murder charge does not establish a due process violation.”).
159

Id. at 1247.

160

Id.

161

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1247.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id. (referring to the court’s holding in Fortner v. State that the State must provide reasons for
its delay only after a defendant makes a prima facie showing of prosecutorial bad faith).
165

Id. at 1243, 1246.

166

Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1246.

167

Id. at 1246–49.

168

Id. at 1246 n.6, 1249.

169

Id.

170

See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
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ANALYSIS
Although the United States and Wyoming constitutions guarantee the quality
of criminal adjudicative processes, the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in
Humphrey II suggests an accused charged with a crime in Wyoming may not,
pragmatically, be protected by these documents.171 By striving to convince the
Wyoming Supreme Court to consider the time between her indictments in its
speedy trial analysis, Humphrey actually sought the more probable avenue to
protecting her right to a fair trial.172 The difﬁcult burden of proving a due process
violation in Wyoming implies the State’s pre-charge law needs reconﬁguration.173

4HE 0RE CHARGE ,AW %STABLISHED IN Marion -UST "E 4AILORED TO !DEQUATELY
'UARD !GAINST THE 0ROSECUTION OF /VERLY 3TALE #RIMINAL #HARGES
To begin, revisiting the context of Wyoming’s adopted due process law will
illuminate the core problems in the State’s current law.174 In -ARION, the appellees,
as in Humphrey II, sought to apply their speedy trial right to pre-accusation delay.175
The Court acknowledged the harmful effects of pre-charge delay and unjust
criminal proceedings.176 However, the speedy trial protection does not activate
until the prosecution publicly charges or arrests an accused.177 Nonetheless, policy
dictates that prejudice must always remain a factor when reviewing criminal
procedure to insure the reliability of the system.178 Thus, the Court held that due

171

Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, WITH WYO. CONST. art. 1 § 10.

172

Compare Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Humphrey I, 120 P.3d 1027 (Wyo. Nov.
14, 2005) (No. 05-649) (“The speedy trial analysis in this case, without any doubt, results in a
conclusion that the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay in bringing her to trial
is signiﬁcant.”) (citation omitted), WITH Humphrey II, 185 P.3d 1236, 1243, 1246 n.6, 1248–49
(Wyo. 2008) (acknowledging the lower courts ﬁnding of substantial prejudice, but reviewing
the same evidence and arguments using a due process analysis, ﬁnding the defendant failed to
demonstrate actual prejudice).
173
%G, Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1348–50 (Wyo. 1996) (declining to ﬁnd defendants
met their burden of proving both intentional delay and actual prejudice); Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d
1139, 1142–44 (Wyo. 1992) (same); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1027–29 (Wyo. 1986) (same).
174
Story, 721 P.2d at 1027 (adopting the principles and tests set forth in United States v.
-ARION).
175
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (declining to accept the appellees’
argument that a three-year delay between the crime and indictment inherently prejudiced them,
providing the grounds for dismissal).
176
Id. at 320, 323 (noting loss of one’s defense, social repose, and vigorous police work are
interests connected to lengthy pre-charge delay) (citations omitted).
177

Id. at 321 (citation omitted).

178

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (“Of [all the defendant’s interests], the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews
the fairness of the entire system.”). The integrity of judicial proceedings, by the administration of
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process would address concerns of lengthy pre-charge delay that prejudice one’s
defense.179
To require proof of intentional misconduct and actual prejudice, however,
demands much from a challenging defendant.180 For one, a defendant cannot
usually obtain the evidence illustrating the reasons for the pre-charge delay.181
Without access to such information, an accused may have difﬁculty even building
a prima facie case of intentional misconduct.182 Second, only in rare instances can
a defendant actually show to what extent the passage of time caused prejudice.183
The exculpatory value of missing evidence will usually appear speculative, even
when such evidence would effectively undermine a prosecutor’s case.184 In lieu of
a more balanced test, however, the United States Supreme Court set these onesided, stringent requirements in response to existing statutes of limitations.185
The United States Supreme Court in -ARION analyzed due process in
conjunction with an unexpired statute of limitation, and stated generally that such
legislation served as the primary means of barring stale prosecutions. 186 -ARION

fair and just convictions, is the senior policy concern in criminal adjudications. 3EE -ARION, 404
U.S. at 324 (requiring dismissal if a defendant proves a violation of due process from prosecutorial
delay); see also United States v. Comosona, 614 F.2d 695, 696 (10th Cir. 1980) (reafﬁrming that
pre-charge delay, which violates due process, must result in case dismissal); see Fortner, 843 P.2d at
1152 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (commenting that notwithstanding the defendant’s guilt, the accused
did not receive a fair trial and the court should have dismissed the case).
179
-ARION, 404 U.S. at 324 (stating that if pre-charge delay (1) causes substantial prejudice to
one’s defense, and (2) stems from prosecutorial bad-faith, courts must dismiss the case for lack of a
fair trial) (citations omitted).
180
See United States v. Barken, 412 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2005) (indicating defendants
rarely meet the burden of showing intentional misconduct and actual prejudice); see generally
Lindsey Powell, 5NRAVELING #RIMINAL 3TATUTES OF ,IMITATIONS, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 119 (2008)
(stating that due process has been “watered-down” in the context of pre-charge delay, and offers
limited protection).
181

Fortner, 843 P.2d at 1143 (citing Goldfarb, supra note 120, at 624–25).

182

See id. at 1150 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

183

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992) (quoting "ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532).

184

Id.

185

-ARION, 404 U.S. at 323–24.

186

Id. at 322–23. -ARION stated:
[Statutes of limitations] represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the
State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; they “are made for
the repose of society and the protection of those who may (during the limitation)
. . . have lost their means of defence.” . . . These statutes provide predictability by
SPECIFYING A LIMIT BEYOND WHICH THERE IS AN IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT A DEFENDANTS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WOULD BE PREJUDICED.

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Accord United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,
789 (1977); Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 906–07 (4th Cir. 1996); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 665–66
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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acknowledged that prejudice to an accused’s defense will eventually arise in a way
a defendant cannot actually demonstrate at trial.187 Fairness to the defendant, the
integrity of the judicial process, and the difﬁculty of proving substantial prejudice
caused by pre-charge delay motivate legislatures to enact statutes of limitations.188
Such statutes preemptively account for defendants’ interests in receiving a fair
trial.189 Due process is a secondary protection in the area of pre-charge delay.190
Thus, -ARION required more from a defendant who sought to prove the criminal
process failed to administer substantial justice, despite an applicable statute of
limitations.191 A major problem arises, however, when a jurisdiction lacks this
primary guarantee against prejudicial delay in prosecution.192
Only two states, including Wyoming, do not have statutes of limitations
for any criminal offense.193 Social mores change and justify the decision against
enacting statutes of limitations.194 This case note does not seek to criticize the
Wyoming legislature for declining to promulgate such statutes, nor does it
advocate for their adoption.195 Wyoming courts must acknowledge, however, that
the United States Supreme Court’s due process analysis complemented statutes
of limitations.196 Without legislation limiting pre-charge delay, the Due Process
Clause becomes the sole means of shielding an accused from prejudicial delay.197

187

3EE -ARION, 404 U.S. at 322 (noting that undeniable prejudice will occur eventually).

188

See id. at 322 n.14 (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672
(1913)); see also Powell, supra note 180, at 129; James Herbie DiFonzo, )N 0RAISE OF 3TATUTES OF
,IMITATIONS IN 3EX /FFENSE #ASES, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (2004).
189

See Powell, supra note 180, at 129–30; see infra note 190.

190

-ARION, 404 U.S. at 322. -ARION stated:
The law has provided other mechanisms to guard against possible as distinguished
from actual prejudice resulting from the passage of time between crime and arrest
or charge. As we [have] said . . . “the applicable statute of limitations . . . is . . . the
primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.”

Id.
191

3EE ,OVASCO, 431 U.S. at 789 (according great weight to statutes of limitation, then proceeding
to set demanding burdens for proving due process violations, and implying that such burdens are
justiﬁed by an alternative means of protection).
192
See Goldfarb, supra note 120, at 620–21, 657–58 (suggesting the -ARION analysis demands
too much of a defendant, and thereby, does not adequately focus on protecting a defendant’s due
process, but focuses on safeguarding prosecutorial discretion).
193
See Powell, supra note 180, at 149 (identifying South Carolina as the other jurisdiction
without such limitations).
194
See generally id. at 124, 135, 138, passim (discussing the history of statutes of limitations and
the rise of retributivism and victims’ rights).
195

See infra note 202 and accompanying text.

196

3EE -ARION, 404 U.S. at 322; see supra notes 186–91 and accompanying text.

197

Fortner, 843 P.2d at 1142; Story, 721 P.2d at 1027 (noting that no state has a statute of
limitations for murder).
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Maintaining the basal requirements for proving due process violations, set
out in -ARION, inadequately accounts for a defendant’s interests when alternate
means of protection do not exist.198 The Wyoming Supreme Court has even
quoted -ARION, saying that in consideration of an applicable statute of limitations,
the mere possibility of prejudice cannot serve as the basis for proving a denial of
due process.199 The United States Supreme Court noted, however, that this ruling
might have been different in the absence of such a limitation period.200
When legislatures do not protect an accused’s interest in avoiding
unidentiﬁable prejudice from pre-charge delay, courts must do this; fairness and
efﬁciency must always be central to the judicial process.201 Wyoming courts can
ensure the integrity of this process by adopting a more balanced due process
analysis.202 Many jurisdictions apply a balancing approach, the type the Wyoming
Supreme Court rejected in Fortner v. State.203 The basis for this balancing analysis
stems from ambiguity in the United States Supreme Court case United States v.
,OVASCO.204

198

Cf. Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1249 (afﬁrming defendant’s conviction and ﬁnding that she
failed to prove intentional prosecutorial misconduct and actual substantial prejudice twenty-four
years after her case was already dismissed and twenty-seven years after the crime occurred).
199

Story, 721 P.2d at 1027 (quoting -ARION, 404 U.S. at 326).

200

3EE -ARION, 404 U.S. at 322 (justifying why the Court would not presume prejudice, noting
the legislature accounted for the probability of prejudice when deciding the length of a limitations
period).
201
"ARKER, 407 U.S. at 532; see Powell, supra note 180, at 139 (stating when governments
abolish statutes of limitations, “interest-balancing,” basic fairness, and efﬁciency are lost as well).
202
See Goldfarb, supra note 120, at 679 (explaining that current applications of the -ARION test
are inadequate to shield defendants, and the judicial system, from the effects of pre-charge delay).
Goldfarb views current pre-charge delay jurisprudence as a “contradiction of other widely shared
norms, such as the need for a high level of accuracy in criminal convictions as an elemental feature
of procedural fairness.” See Goldfarb supra note 120, at 673.
203
Fortner, 843 P.2d at 1144; e.g. United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 451 (7th Cir. 1994)
(“[O]nce the defendant has proven actual and substantial prejudice, the government must come
forward and provide its reasons for the delay. The reasons are then balanced against the defendant’s
prejudice.”); Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that once a defendant
makes a showing of actual prejudice, the defendant must submit legitimate reasons for the delay,
at which time the reviewing court will weigh the degree of prejudice with the reasons for delay to
decide whether the prosecution violated due process); Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Ok. App.
Ct. 1991) (balancing the reasons for delay with prejudice to the defendant); People v. Lesiuk, 617
N.E.2d 1047, 1050 (N.Y. 1993) (“Where there has been a prolonged delay, we impose a burden
on the prosecution to establish good cause.” (citation omitted)); State v. Robinson, No. L-06-1182,
2008 WL 2700002, at *17 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. July 11, 2008) (requiring defendant to show actual
prejudice to his or her defense, then requiring the State to justify its delay, and then the court weighs
the reasons for delay with the degree of prejudice).
204
State v. Gonzales, 794 P.2d 361, 363–64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); United States v. Mays,
549 F.2d 670, 675, (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]here has been a good deal of confusion as to whether the
two elements delineated in the [-ARION] opinion actual (or substantial) prejudice, and intentional
delay by the government for an improper purpose are to be applied in a conjunctive or disjunctive
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Although the defendant in ,OVASCO proved actual prejudice, the United
States Supreme Court considered the reasons for the delay before dismissing the
case.205 The Court held the government justiﬁably delayed prosecution, which
outweighed the prejudice it caused the defendant.206 Since this decision, various
United States appellate courts either balance the due process elements as factors
(the disjunctive approach), consider each a necessary element for the defendant
to prove (conjunctive approach), or have yet to clearly choose an analysis.207 To
better account for defendants’ rights, jurisdictions without statutes of limitations,
like Wyoming, should adopt the disjunctive method of analyzing pre-charge
delay, instead of the one-sided conjunctive approach.208

!DDING 0RESUMPTIVE 0REJUDICE TO THE ,AW OF 0RE #HARGE $ELAY -AY "ETTER
%NSURE $UE 0ROCESS
To completely guarantee due process, without the assistance of statutes of
limitations, Wyoming courts should also consider adopting part of the speedy
trial analysis: the presumption of prejudice when excessive delays ensue.209 The
United States Supreme Court case, Doggett v. United States, provides justiﬁcation
for this method.210 In that case, the government formally indicted a defendant

manner.”). The “conjunctive” approach requires the defendant to prove both elements, while the
“disjunctive” approach distributes the burden of proof. 'ONZALES, 794 P.2d at 363–67.
205

,OVASCO, 431 U.S. at 790.

206

See id. at 796–97 (“In light of [the government’s] explanation, it follows that compelling
respondent to stand trial would not be fundamentally unfair.”). The Court did ﬁnd prejudice to the
accused, however. Id.
See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., Unconstitutional pre-accusation delays, in 5 CRIM. PROC.
§ 18.5(b) (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the various approaches); 'ONZALES, 794 P.2d at 363–67; -AYS,
549 F.2d at 675 n.6–7 (discussing the various approaches). See supra note 203 (citing examples of
jurisdictions applying the disjunctive analysis).
207

208
United States v. Sabath, 990 F. Supp. 1007, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (indicating that while
prosecutorial discretion in bringing charges is highly valued and the remedy of dismissal is extreme,
due process requires fair proceedings and the truest method of testing the process is for a court
to weigh the interests of both parties) (quoting United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.
1984)). A good argument exists that proving unlawful pre-charge delay is too difﬁcult. See LAFAVE
supra note 207, § 18.5(b). See also Goldfarb supra note 120, at 666–67, 679–80 (explaining that
current pre-charge delay jurisprudence is overly burdensome for a defendant, and courts should
adopt more balanced means of testing due process). Goldfarb also proposes examining due process
violations using the same factor test employed in speedy trial analyses. See Goldfarb supra note 120,
at 625, 679–80.
209
3EE -ARION, 404 U.S. at 321 (“Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair
memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere
with his ability to defend himself.”); see Goldfarb, supra note 120, at 631–32 (“In fact, uncharged
defendants lacking notice of a prosecution that would induce them to forestall the erosion of defense
evidence are likely to suffer even greater delay-related prejudice than are charged defendants.”).
210

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655.
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who the police could not locate.211 For eight-and-a-half years the accused
remained unaware of the indictment and lived freely, under his true name, until
the government apprehended him.212 While examining the fourth factor of the
speedy trial analysis, prejudice to the accused, the Court realized the defendant
could only allege one type of prejudice: an injured defense.213 Although Doggett
could not specify how the delay hindered his defense, the Court dismissed the
case.214 In doing so, the Court explained that instances of lengthy delay may
require a court to assume prejudice to an accused’s defense, since demonstrating
actual prejudice could be impossible.215
Aside from the technical fact that the government indicted Doggett, the
circumstances resembled those in a pre-charge analysis.216 It seems reasonable,
then, to allow for this presumption in a due process context.217 As evidenced in
Doggett, delay in compelling a defendant to stand trial, regardless of formal charges
or arrest, leads to the unavailability of evidence and testimony, and precisely the
type of harm pre-charge delay begets.218 Again, instances arise when neither a
defendant nor a prosecutor can truly demonstrate the effects of missing evidence
and faded memories, which suggests that always requiring an accused to show
actual prejudice undermines the integrity of the judicial process.219
Humphrey II exempliﬁes the injustice that can result from strictly applying
-ARION’s due process analysis without alternate means of guarding against overly
stale prosecution.220 Twenty-four years after a dismissal for lack of probable cause,
with no indication of newly discovered evidence, the Natrona County District
Court weighed the interests of both parties and found the re-prosecution
unconstitutional.221 Had the Wyoming Supreme Court fully recognized that

211

Id. at 648–49.

212

Id. at 649–50.

213

Id. at 654 (noting the absence of oppressive incarceration and anxiety, the other evils targeted by the Speedy Trial Clause).
214

Id. at 658.

215

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (“[E]xcessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a
trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.”).
216

See id. at 656.

217

3EE -ARION, 404 U.S. at 322 (implying the passage of time, eventually, will prejudice a
defendant’s case in an undeniable manner).
218
See Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1246 n.6 (recognizing the Natrona County District Court’s
ﬁnding of actual prejudice to defendant regarding the twenty-four year delay between subsequent
indictments).
219

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655.

220

See Humphrey II, 185 P.3d at 1246 n.6, 1249 (acknowledging the lower court’s ﬁnding of
actual prejudice through the sensitive speedy trial test, but overruling this ﬁnding when viewing the
same evidence under the tenets of the Due Process Clause).
221

Id. at 1242.
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Humphrey’s interests were not accounted for by the legislature, and balanced
this prejudice against the reasons for delay, Humphrey would have received due
process.222 In addition, the court may have also dismissed Humphrey’s case.223
In summary, statutes of limitations normally reﬂect the interests of defendants
and society in barring overly stale prosecutions.224 Due to the absence of such
legislation in Wyoming, however, the Supreme Court of Wyoming must remodel
its due process analysis to prevent unfair, pre-charge delay.225 By comparing
the prosecution’s reasons for the pre-charge delay with the resulting prejudice,
defendants will have realistic means of protecting their right to a fair trial.226
Notably, the only other jurisdiction without any statutes of limitations, South
Carolina, employs this balancing method of analysis.227

CONCLUSION
The district court’s dismissal of Humphrey’s latest murder charges in 2005
reﬂected sound reasoning; the twenty-four year period between indictments
seemed to irreparably harm Humphrey’s defense.228 In fact, the court did ﬁnd the
pre-indictment delay to substantially prejudice her case.229 However, the court’s

222

See supra note 172 and accompanying text (comparing the different court ﬁndings in
relation to the type of analysis used: speedy trial factor-test versus the due process analysis).
223
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, supra note 172, at 5 (“The speedy trial analysis in
this case, without any doubt, results in a conclusion that the prejudice suffered by the defendant
as a result of the delay in bringing her to trial is signiﬁcant.”) (citation omitted). The district court
applied the speedy trial analysis, balancing prejudice with reasons for the delay. See Humphrey II,
185 P.3d at 1242.
224
-ARION, 404 U.S. at 322; accord, e.g., ,OVASCO, 431 U.S. at 789–90, 793, 794; Comosona,
848 F.2d at 1114.
225
See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text. “It still remains ‘a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.’” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 73 (1988) (Blackmun J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
226

See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text (explaining why courts should adopt a
balanced method of evaluating due process violations from pre-charge delay). See also supra note 203
(citing courts that have chosen to employ a more balanced analysis (the disjunctive approach)).
227

State v. Brazell, 480 S.E.2d 64, 68–69 (S.C. 1997); State v. Lee, 602 S.E.2d 113, 117
(S.C. Ct. App. 2004). No state has a statute of limitation for serious crimes like murder. Story,
721 P.2d at 1027. Some courts have adopted a balancing approach to evaluate pre-charge delay
in murder cases. People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 58 (Cal. 2008) (synthesizing its precedent, in a
case of ﬁrst-degree felony murder, to expressly hold that reasons for delay will be compared to
the defendant’s prejudice); State v. Luck, 472 N.E.2d 1097, 1104–05 (Ohio 1984) (balancing the
defendant’s prejudice with the State’s reasons for delay, in a murder case).
228
See supra notes 150, 152, 159 and accompanying text (noting the unavailability of
evidence).
229

See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text (noting the district court’s ﬁnding of
substantial prejudice).
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ﬁnding did not ultimately favor Humphrey, because the speedy trial right only
applies after formal indictment or arrest.230 As the Wyoming Supreme Court later
directed, the district court should have determined the effects of that twenty-four
year period under a due process analysis.231 Interestingly, by doing so the outcome
of Humphrey’s case was drastically altered.232
Humphrey’s pre-charge situation, viewed through a speedy trial lens, permitted
the district court to balance the reasons for delay against the resulting prejudices
and dismiss her case.233 Unlike the evenhanded speedy trial analysis, proving the
lack of due process requires a defendant to prove actual prejudice and prima facie
intentional delay by the prosecution.234 This case highlights how difﬁcult it can be
for a defendant to successfully prove a due process violation caused by pre-charge
delay, even if circumstances suggest otherwise.235
In light of Wyoming’s reluctance to enact statutes of limitations for any crime,
and that the United States Supreme Court established the law of pre-charge
delay with such statutes in mind, this case note seeks to encourage the Wyoming
Supreme Court to revamp its due process law.236 The court can properly guarantee
a fair trial by adopting a method of evaluating due process that compares reasons
for the pre-charge delay to the level of prejudice asserted by the accused.237 In
certain instances, a court should even consider a presumption of prejudice when
the delay is truly excessive.238
“To accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights of the
defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the
circumstances of each case.”239 In the case of Humphrey II, had the Wyoming
Supreme Court applied this logic and carefully balanced the interests of both
the prosecution and defense, the State would have ensured fair play and justice,
displaying the integrity of Wyoming’s judicial system.240

230

See supra note 144 and accompanying text.

231

See supra notes 18, 144 and accompanying text.

232

See supra note 172 and accompanying text.

233

See supra notes 13, 15, 49 and accompanying text.

234

See supra notes 103, 122 and accompanying text.

235

See supra notes 172, 202.

236

See supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.

237

See supra note 208 and accompanying text.

238

See supra notes 209–19 and accompanying text.

239

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971).

240

See supra notes 178, 201 and accompanying text (discussing why a lack of statutes of
limitations requires courts to modify their pre-charge law in order to guarantee due process in cases
of prosecutorial delay).
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